The case of Virginia provides a valuable opportunity to analyze tbe relationship between socioeconomic and demographic factors and rates of enlistment. Because the state possessed a large population of nonslavebolders and had a long history of regionally distinct economic and political systems and vibrant two-party politics, it offered incentives for both pro-Confederate and pro-Union loyalties. Indeed, a sizeable group of Virginians rejected tbe Confederacy and formed the new Union state of West Virginia during the war. Across Virginia as a whole, bowever, and even in parts of West Virginia, Confederates successfully mobilized a very high proportion of eligible white men. Tbey did so by drawing on those communities tbat profited from the economic development or the democratic politics of the late antebellum era. Residents who benefited from the slave economy, Virginia's dynamic regional and national markets, or the political networks of antebellum Virginia proved willing to defend tbat world in its Confederate form. This included a large community of nonslaveholders, who perceived advantages to living in a slave society. Tbe pattern of enlistment in Civil War Virginia thus reveals tbe salience of material factors in spurring secession and support for the Confederacy, Virginia unionists controlled the state secession convention from its opening in February into the early days of April.^ On April 4,1861, delegates considered and rejected secession, but news of the figbt at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, on April 12 galvanized immediate secessionists, and opinion began to tilt in tbeir direction. Tbe decisive sbift bappened on April 15, wben Lincoln calied up 75,000 ninety-day men from across tbe country to belp put down tbe "insurrection" in the Lower Soutb, Virginia unionists interpreted Lincoln's actions as betrayal. All spring, they bad negotiated in good faith with Republican officeholders and party leaders and bad received assurances that Fort Sumter would be given up and the Lower South slowly drawn back into tbe Union. Instead, Lincoln's call for troops confirmed tbe worst fears of tbe immediate secessionists, whom unionists had denotinced as Confederate Armies, Vol. i: Virginia (New York: Fads on File, 1991) with the individual unit histories from the Virginia Regimental History Series (Lynchburg: H. E. Howard, 19S1-) (hereafter VRHS). I used discrete company-level enlistment figures wherever possible; forty of the VRHS regimental histories included exact enlistment numbers by company. For the remaining tmits I divided the regimental total evenly among the number of companies that filled each regiment. By averaging the company sizes, 1 maintained the accuraq'of the regimental totaJ but flattened out discrepancies in enlistment numbers from the different counties that contributed companies. On the positive side, my estimated company sizes are roughly similar to the exact company totals 1 pulled from the VRHS unit histories. My county totals probably offer a close degree of accuracy for each region (assuming that few men traveled more than a county or two away to enlist) anda fairdegreecf accuracy for each county. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989 ), 140; Henry T. Shanks, The Secession Movement m Virginia JS47-IS6I (Richmond: Garrett and Massie Publishers, 1934), 156. bekig irresponsible. Now, tbe unionists looked irresponsible, blind to the treachery of the Repubbcan administrarion. Worse still, Lincoln planned to raise an army to marcb south through Vb-ginia. If he had deceived Virginians about his intentions toward Fort Sumter, they reasoned, perhaps he was lying about the purpose of tbe ariny. In many cases, former unionists became tbe most immediate and ardent Confederates in response to what they perceived as Lincoln's duplicity.
2, Daniel Crofts, iieiuciam Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis
On April 17 the convention delegates passed an ordinance of secession and the state governinent began preparing for war. The process of mobilizing the state's manpower required significant time and energy from the Virginia and Confederate governments; but once Virginia seceded, responsibility for action shifted to the ordinary men of the state who supported that decision by pledging their lives to defend its sovereignty. Almost all military units were organized locally, petitioning the governor for acceptance into state service and incorporating themselves into the rapidly growing state organization. Virginia's troops were mustered into Confederate service en masse on July 1,1861, by which time the state bad 41.885 volunteers on its payroll. By February 1862 tbe Confederate Bureau responsible for counting troops enumerated 54,950 Virginians enlisted in tbe Confederate army. According to Confederate officials, this figure was 85 percent of the total that Virginia would be expected to supply if the state raised its full share of regiments.^ As with so many other expectations at the start of the war, this one proved wholly inaccurate. By the end of tbe Civil War, Virginia would raise anotber 100,000 troops beyond those in service in early 1862.'' Emotional, intellectual, and material factors all influenced a man's decision to join tbe Confederate army. Southerners perceived Lincoln's election in i860, and especially his militia call, as an affront to their honor. Tbe masculine cult of bonor, as it developed in tbe antebellum Soutb, was higbly attuned to perceived 3. Paymaster General's Report, in Governor Letcher's address to the General Assembly, Dec. 2,1861, ¡ournal 4. The state eventually sent 155,231 men into service for the Confederaq-, two-thirds of whom served in infantry regiments. This figure is based on regimental enlistment totals from the Virginia Regimental History Series published by H. E. Howard of Lynchburg, Virginia. I used the Population Schedule of the i860 Census to estimate how many men were eligible for military service during the war. My figures are very dose to those compiled by the Confederate Conscription Bureau, which in February 1864 estimated the number of men the military had enrolled from each state. In early 18Ó4 the Bureau estimated Virginia had put 153,876 men into service. John S. Preston to James A. Seddon, Feb. 9,1864, OR, ser. 4, vol. 3:95-102 . The i>355-nian discrepancy between these figures could be accounted for by the men who volunteered or were drafted after February 1864. Like Virginia and Confederate officials at the time, I included all the counties of Virginia in i860 in my calculations.
offenses, and its adberents demanded immediate and usually physical retribution for these slights.* When Northerners elected a strictly sectional candidate. Southerners believed that they were being excluded from tbe nation's administration and perbaps its future. The special betrayal felt by Virginia unionists, who had publicly defended Lincoln in the faU and spring, added a personal element that helped fuse the demands of individual, family, state, and new "national" bonor.
Southerners' second response to Lincoln's militia call was concern for the physical safety of their families. In Virginia this concern translated into military service, because most men believed tbat only an army could protect the South's families. Tbat sense grew stronger as tbe war dragged on, as a Confederate from tbe Virginia Piedmont revealed in an 1863 letter. "I bad an idea of resigning some time ago," he wrote bis wife, "but 1 have come to tbe conclusion that the Yankees are too close by Home to resign. I am afraid that tbey will get my Boy, Now is tbe time to fight them while tbe Yankees are recruiting."* An additional masculine imperative also compelled secession. This one was rooted in tbe home, not public space where the culture of honor was maintained. Virginia men, like most Southerners in the antebellum era, developed strong bonds of emotion witbin their families; these loving relationships spurred secession and helped maintain support for the war. Samuel Moore, a lawyer from Chariestown, Virginia, offered a frank assessment of his motives for serving in a letter to his young son, "My Dear Little Boy," Moore ivrote, "War is a dreadful thing, and I wotild rather do anything in the world than kill a man or help to kill one-but then if we were to let Lincoln's army pass here, they might go into the State of Virginia and burn our bomes and fcHl the old men and the women and children, and do a great deal more harm-and I am sure I would rather see a thousand of them kiiled around me, than to know that they had done any harm to my wife and dear little boys."' Moore's use of family as his reference point reflected the changes occurring in American social life during the half-century before the Civil War, when men and women began to value affectionate family bonds as a central part of their lives.^Because love and emo-.BermmWystt-Brown^Southern Honor: EthicsandBehaviorintheOldSouthiVieviYorh Norton, 1978 men to enlist in Confederate armies but that underneath these elements lay a deep commitment to preserving the social, political, and economic status quo of antebellum Virginia. The socioeconomic and demographic diversity of the state was mapped against a scheme of physical divisions. Virginians in the 1850s understood their state as consisting of five regions distinguished by their ecology, geology, and weather patterns as well as distinct and generally complementary economic systems and political orientations. " The tidewater, with its old colonial heritage, held a symbolic place as the state's most influential region, but by i860 it held neither the most people nor the most wealth. An antebellum traveler in Virginia's piedmont, beginning at the faU line and riding west to the gentle slope of the Blue Ridge Mountains, would have tinderstood immediately why families in this region held more personal property and more valuable real estate than any other. Living among hundreds of square miles of fertile soil laced by rivers fiowing out of the mountains to the west, prosperous households in this region held more slaves than their neighbors in other regions, and they used those slaves in the production of a diverse array of crops and animals. Like families in the piedmont, people living in Virginia's Shenandoah VaUey, between the Blue Ridge and Allegheny Mountains, profited well from rich soil and dependable water supplies. Despite owning fewer slaves than households in either the piedmont or the tidewater, residents of the upper valley used slaves in a variety of tasks and to good effect; some of the state's wealthiest citizens lived in this area. Average family wealth in real estate (not personal property) was higher in the valley than in the tidewater, reflecting the shift in land values during the antebellum era, " During the legislative debates about the future of slavery in Virginia in the early 1830s, many legislators and voters assumed a fundamental confiict between the largely nonslaveholding trans-Allegheny region and the largely slaveholding eastern regions, but by the 1850s that simple dichotomy did not reflect reality." Two decades of rising prices had encouraged many tidewater planters to sell their slaves to new farmers in the expanding cotton belt of Alabama and Mississippi. Accelerating this dispersa! of slaves across Virginia, some planters moved west to find fresh land and new places to establish themselves, ''' Although farmers in the southwest corner of the state held low numbers of slaves compared to their piedmont and tidewater colleagues, during the late 12. In distinguishing Virginia's regions ! have applied the boundaries used by the state auditor in response to a request from the Secession Convention to enumerate the men avail- 
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• 1, Virginia in i860 with County and Regional Boondai antebellum era these men began to expand tbeir use of slaves, especially in the production of tohacco. They also reached out more aggressively to deliver their products to markets, particularly in western Nortb Carobna and Tennessee.'^ As a resuh of these decisions and trends, people in Virginia to the south and west of the Shenandoah Valley identified with the South, The opposite was true for people in northwest Virginia, who had little investment in the slave economy that dominated the rest of the state. Their commercial contacts flowed along the Kanawha River toward Pittsburgb and markets iti southern Pennsylvania and Ohio, and people in this region identified more closely with Northern interests. The distinct interests ofthe northwestern corner ofthe state compelled its residents to pursue a mucb more cautious policy of engagement with the new Confederacy, With the exception ofthe upper northwest, the geographic pattern of enlistment over the course of tbe war reveals the evenly distributed and near-total mobilization that Confederate Virginians accomplished during the crisis.'* Howard, Antebellum leaders still feared the salience of the broad east-west division that had been so prominent as late as the early 1850s. What hindsight allows historians to see is tbat regional animosities alone did not present a sufficient obstacle to organizing soldiers for the Confederacy. Throughout the valley and the southwest, hostility to eastern elites ran deep, and men enlisted in high numbers. For example, both contemporaries and historians have focused on tbe community debate among residents of tbe valley about wbether to join with prosecession counties from east of the Blue Ridge or to follow their more conservative neighbors to the north and west who feared the destruaion tbat war would bring to tbe border states.'^Tbe early 186: arguments over secession and its consequences undoubtedly reflected and generated tensions in the region, but once tbe war began vaUey men, like most others around tbe state, enlisted in high numbers.
Many counties in tbe northwest also organized Confederate units, with most enrolling in excess of 25 percent of their eligible men and many in excess of 50 percent. " Still, people in the northwest organized fewer Confederate companies than any other part of the state because of their prewar economic, political, and social ties to the North, tbeir low rates of slave-and wealth-holding, and because Francis Pierpont's government, with the aid of the Union army, controlled much of the region during the war." Virginians quickly identified tbe weak response of 
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tbe nortbwestern portion of tbe state. On June 12,1861, a northern piedmont newspaper printed an editorial on the "Sentiment of Northwestern Virginia," Concerned that northwest Virginia might break away from the state, tbe editor blamed any prospective split on unionists' campaign of political terror, "No matter wbat may be tbe social position of gentlemen, their previous associations or social qualities, unless they fully coincide with die Union sentiment ofthe masses, they are driven from tbeir homes by vandal Virginians, urged on to the perpetration of acts of malice and violence by the presence of federal troops,"'" Tbe Democratic Mirror accurately assessed the political sentiment of this part ofthe state; al! of those counties that organized no companies for Confederate service were located in the upper northwest, mostly along the border with the Nortb. It was the specific amalgam of low slaveholding, low wealth-hoi ding, political attachment to the Union, and location that belps explain tbe unique response of northwestern Virginians in comparison to their western bretbren. Tbe reluctance of people from this region to support secession or the Confederacy in mid-1861 produced a solid triangle of Confederate country in Virginia that ran from the lower valley counties of Berkeley and Jefferson southwest through the Kanawha River VaUey, east along the North Carolina state line, and north up tbe Atlantic seaboard to Washington, D.C.
One important tradition that northwest Virginians shared with their fellow Virginians to the south and east was politics. Until tbe April 17 vote on secession in tbe Virginia Secession Convention,politics in tbe nortbwest resembled other parts of the state. During the i860 presidential election, John Breckinridge, the Southern Democratic candidate usually associated most closely with pro-secession forces, drew substantial support Irom tlie largely unionist voters of the valley and the northwest. Most antebellum observers of the state understood that differences m the concentration ofslavery distinguished northwesternVirginia from other parts of the state, but voters from high slaveholding counties voted the sanne way as voters from low slaveholding counties. Tbe Breckinridge supporters, for instance, were mostly loyal Democrats voting-as most Americans did in the mid-nineteenth century-according to weli-denned and usually permanent party loyalties. The politics of secession, however, threatened to undo the Democrats' dominance within the state. A strong unionist surge, based mostly in areas of Whig strength, together with a noticeable Democratic component, forestalled Virginia's secession in February and ensured a long fight in tbe convention over Virginia's role in the conflict.^' Virginia controlled the Secession Convention and discussed compromise proposals witb the Lincoln administration and Republicans in Congress. As mentioned above, when Lincoln issued his call for troops, Virginia unionists responded with outrage, and the betrayal they felt precipitated another significant shift in the political landscape of Virginia. James B. Dormán, a unionist delegate to the convention from the valley, typifies the change among delegates and the tenacity witb which these men held to secession once committed. In March 1861 Dormán was generally pleased with Lincoln's inaugural address and convinced that Lincoln had given up all interest in "Coercion." When Lincoln called for troops on Marchi5, Dormán's position became indistinguishable firom that of the rabid secessionists he had scorned in previous weeks. "I have no idea that our people will tamely submit to Lincoln's arrogant and infamous usurpation of power, and to his diabolical purpose of waging war with a force of 50,000 Northern men against the Southern states. The issue is presented of a fight, and the question is simply 'which side vrill you take?'" Dorman's cousin, a staunch unionist in Lexington, Virginia, made the same shift to secession as evidenced by a letter that crossed paths with his cousin's. "We are now, we all know, in the midst of revolution. There seems to be one feeling, and now that we should 'in mutual, with closed ranks, march aU one way.'"" For those who did not fall in step voluntarily, the Virginia government demanded their support, in mid-April the Lynchburg Daily Virgitiian reported, "Governor Letcher will issue his proc- History and Biography 73 (Jan. 19651: 78-10; . reeiiwa lamation forewarning all the persons in the Commonwealth from corresponding with, aiding or abetting one Abraham Lincoln, and that whoever shall do so will be considered traitors, and be dealt with accordingly."" Because of the transformative nature of secession, the enlistment pattern during the war bore no relation to the pattern of votes in the i860 election and little relation to the voting in the Secession Convention itself. Strongly pro-Union counties did form the majority of those places that organized no companies for the Confederacy, but even in diehard unionist areas more than half of the counties sent some men, and nearly a third sent more than 50 percent of their eligible men. For example, several valley counties that had been resolutely pro-Union during the convention became strongholds of support for the Confederacy once Virginia seceded. Frederick, Augusta, and Rockingham Counties aU sent more than 50 percent of their eligible men to serve in Confederate armies. Not surprisingly, all of the strong secession communities sent men to fight, and twothirds sent more than 75 percent of their eligible men.
For those who had advocated secession before Lincoln's militia call, enlistment was the logical extension of their political commitment. The idea of limited government, advanced from Madison and Jefferson's Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 through the late antebellum vagaries of "state rights" offered an important justification, if not explanation, for secession. White men in the nineteenth century treated politics and political ideology very seriously, and many Confederates were motivated to enlist or support the new nation by a desire to preserve a political ideology they imagined to be endangered by Lincoln's election. The paradox of State rights-many of its most fervent supporters also advocated federal protection of slavery in the territories and denounced the "personal liberty laws" of some Northern states that sought to nullify the Fugitive Slave Actdid not deter most Southerners from adopting it as the cornerstone of their political ideology in the 1850s. By itself, the theory of state rights or limited government could not compel secession. Southern political leaders understood this and shaped their rhetoric accordingly. They argued, and most Southerners perceived, that Lincoln's election was a threat to their social and economic order; abolition, free love, and a new class of disaffected industrial workers all loomed in the nightmare to come under a Republican administration, V/hen bundled with the specter of these dangers, state rights provided an elegant philosophical justification and a familiar political language with which to understand secession.''' Many pro-state rights Virginians were ideologues who believed strongly in the need for an independent Confederacy. Most assumed that Southern victory would come with relative ease, and they committed themselves to the physical Z3, Lynchburg Daily Virglmaii, Apr. 17,1861, 24. William I, Cooper Jr,, Liberty's Slavery: Southern Politics to i860 {New York: Knopf, struggle just as they had the intellectual and social struggle for secession in the first place. Edmund Ruffin, the Virginia planter, agricultural expert, and ardent pro-secessionist, is one of tbe most weli-known examples: he fired the first shot on Fort Surater to start the war, and all of his sons enlisted in tbe Confederate military at the onset of hostilities. Most white Virginians transferred tbeir allegiance from one national government to the next just as smoothly as fire-eaters like Ruffin. Robert Hooke, who joined the ist Virginia Cavalry in April 1861 wrote a brief note bome after enlisting. His first camp letter reads like many sent by young soldiers in the heady days of April: "When I will see you all if ever I trust in God for that and I hope if it should be bis will that we would not meet on earth I hope we may meet where there will be no war neither parting[.] It goes right hard for me to leave but I intend to bold to my company and defend my Country and our consolation is if I bave to be killed it will be in defending my Country & Farewell, Farewell perhaps forever who knows|.] I would like to write a great deal more but there is such an excitement I cannot-Yours Forever, Robt. Hooke."" Like politics, evangelical Cbristianity provided another layer of justification for secession and, later, inspiration for supporting tbe Confederacy. Robert Hooke was not alone in imbuing his political commitment to his new "country" with deep religious faith. Religion had informed the idea of Southern separatism for years, witb ministers defending the sanctity of the South and arguing against Northern abolitionist attacks on tbe region. Building on a bibiical defense of slavery, Soutbern ministers criticized abolitionists for investing Christianity with a political power that had corrupted tbe Nortbern church. In tbe process, they sanctified secession as a religious obligation. Tbis interpretation shifted the debate from political economy to spiritual freedom, an issue witb much higher stakes. Most white Southerners were convinced tbat God was on their side, and tbis provided crucial reassurance throughout tbe war.-'As one man confided to his brotber during a battle, "Knowing their [ "''"' "-' our strength. 'The batde is not to tbe strong' if He be on our side. It is so full of comfort to know that He rules and directs tbe destinies of armies & nations."" Wben religion or patriotism failed to inspire men to enlist. Confederate civilians around the state exerted social pressure, particularly in small communities. Counties with I arge r-th an-ave rage populations actually offered proportionally fewer men than did smaller places. Only 7 percent of the counties in the smallest population quhitile sent fewer than 10 percent of their eligible men to fight for the Confederacy. For the two largest quintiles, 23 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of eligible men enlisted. Larger places may have permitted a broader diversity of opinion toward the Confederacy so that men who disagreed with its goals did not need to support it physically. Because of tbeir size, cities and towns also provided greater opportunities for men to avoid service.
barder time avoiding service. The larger counties may bave supported more diversified economic productivity and maintained more national trade contacts, so resistance to tbe war could have come from an interest tbat grew out of the nature of those places. So too, men living in smaller places and witb fewer economic opportunities may have felt that the threat to their livelihood posed by the Lincoln administration demanded direct action.
In counties with only a few hundred eligihle men, everyone who did not support the Confederacy had to endure public scrutiny. Newspapers in places big and small played an active role in encouraging men to volunteer. The Lexington Valley Star, publisbed in one of tbe towns in the upper Shenandoah Valley, included extensive reports on the organization of companies in the area. Throughout May 1861 the paper, like others around Virginia, included full lists of die names of men who had joined local companies.^* The result of this pressure was obvious to those wbo traveled through the state that same month. James Davidson, a valley lawyer, took the train north through Virginia and surveyed the public attitude. "When I left home I wondered if other counties were as enthused as Rockbridge, for I thought we had been first up almost to a conflagration. But I found, upon my 'winding way,' that Augusta, Albemarle, Orange, Culpeper, Prince William, Clark, Shenandoah, Jefferson, etc. were aU like uson fire."" The social pressure continued through the summer, often ÍTOm women who advocated secession and traded on notions of masculinity to compel men to enlist. In August 1861 a young woman bragged to a friend in uniform about the efforts at home: "I heard ofthe be.st thing on Nathan Price. He went to the blocks to wait on Miss Nancy Miller Harvey and she would not allow him thanked him that she didn't want stay backs to wait on her. Time afrerwards ber buggy and borse were in a ratber critical condition, Nathan and Jimmie Tbornton rode up and assisted her and said as tbey left, that 'they guessed sbe was glad to get stay backs now' and sbe announced 'No, I tbank you sir, You volunteered your services. I didn't ask you.'"'" If some men avoided military service by hiding in large cities, others simply bougbt their way out, Tbe most direct way wealthy men could ensure they stayed home was by sending a substitute in tbeir place. Wealthy men used tbeir status to secure positions within tbe civil or military bureaucracy in Ricbmond or to attain appointments to local militia companies, which would exempt them from service. Anecdotal evidence has compelled some historians to emphasize the divisive nature of class relations within the Confederate South, in particular by arguing that poor men bore a disproportionate burden ofthe war.''
The experience of tbe war in Virginia, however, does not bear out this argument, as the enlistment data attest. Places witb bigber-than-average household wealth tended to organize more companies than did tbe counties with mostly middle-and lower-income families. All of tbe state's wealtbiest counties sent more than 25 percent of their men, and most sent more than half tbeir eligible maie population. When enlistment rates and wealth holdings are analyzed against eacb other, they reveal a positive linear relationship; the more weahh a community held, the more likely it was to send high numbers of men to the army. Rich men did fight the Civil War,"
For poor men tbe situation appears more complicated. Over half of the counties that organized no volunteer companies were located in places ivith the lowest household incomes. Many of these places were located in the northwest, where low rates of slaveholding may also have contributed to a lack of enthusiasm for the Confederate cause. Quite possibly nonslavebolding families in this region with lower-than-average bousebold wealtb bad grown dissatisfied with their inability to compete witb tbe larger farms, manned witb slave labor, in the Household Wealth Figure 3 . Percentage of Men Enlisted by Average Household Wealth rest of the state. Their decision to rejoin the Union may have stemmed from concern over the economy rather than any ideological opposition to slavery. Poor communities in the southwest seem to have had the opposite reaction. There, and in the valley, many Virginia counties with middle-or lower-income families sent higher numbers of men to figbt.'*'^In tbese places, surrounded in all directions by other slaveholders, poor men could just as easily bave interpreted the possibility of not having access to slaves as the most serious threat to their economic future. Recent studies of Virginia show that despite complaints about inequities, middle-and lower-class citizens did not abandon tbeir support for the Confederacy.'-' For those poor men who did fight, the war offered its own opportunities for advancement. Less frequently noted in wartime accounts, but a crucial motivation nonetheless, was the pay that soldiers received. For many young men who entered the army in the first wave, the opportunity to earn a steady salary (if only for a few months) was no small incentive. As one man observed when his company paymaster finally set up an office in September 1861, the men manifest a great desire to speedily get hold of'the needful.'"^^ The timing of the war's opening shots fit well into the yearly work cycle for most Virginians. Planting was nearly concluded when most men lefr to join the army, and they anticipated a return by the fall for harvesting. In the interim the opportunity to earn cash for military service seemed to some like a good opportunity. Visions of stockpiling a nest egg for capital improvements at home turned out to be hopelessly optimistic, however, as rampant inflation decreased the value of Confederate script throughout the war. Fven so, remuneration for military service did provide indticement early on.
The strong interest that wealthy communities showed in Confederate independence was shared by those communities with a strong commitment to slavery. Slaveholders had an obvious interest in protecting the economic and social system on which they built their prosperity, and most of those places with high rates ofslaveholding sent high proportions of their men to fight, but so too did many places with low rates of slaveholding. Explaining the participation of nonslavehoiders in the secession movement and in Confederate armies continues to be one of the most challenging tasks facing American historians. The patterns of enlistment in the Confederate army in Virginia confirm that nonslavehoiders did participate in high nutnbers. The specific shape of the patterns suggest that many nonslavehoiders fought for the Confederacy because they too had an interest in maintaining the status quo, for economic and social reasons, as well as ideological ones.'* The economic and social advantages white men enjoyed in the Old South were considerable. In many places, slaveholders purchased agricultural products from their nonslaveholding farmer neighbors, maintaining local markets that kept agriculture profitable. Slaveholders all over the state deployed slave labor to build the vibrant and ñexible economy that provided many nonslaveholding families with a standard of living almost unmatched in the world. Nonsiaveholders also enjoyed the privilege of being white in a society built on Destiny. 1817-191^ (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) . Slavery shaped the relationships Virginians established among themselves and with outsiders; hence, defending Virginia in i860 was defending slavery. During the secession crisis, political elites made no effort to hide this fact. To the contrary, they based many of their impassioned appeals specificaüy on the danger posed to slavery by Republican control of the federal government," Direct admissions by soldiers tbat tbey were figbting to defend tbeir economic stake in slavery were rare, a direct result of slavery's centrality to Southern economic growth.'' Even though few men recorded their sentiments about slavery, it is important to recognize that slavery did play a role in motivating men to enlist and serve in Confederate armies. At tbe most basic level, Confederates fought to retain their property and to ensure that it would be passed on to tbeir descendants. Edmund Ruffin bimself recognized tbe relationsbip between protection of slavery and willingness to serve the Confederacy. For Ruffin, his biographer writes, "the cause involved no desire to preserve mastery over slaves for its own sake, nor to save some paternalistic rural lordship. Rather, it involved calculations of what he would lose materially if deprived of slave property and slave labor."''"Regular soldiers demonstrated this concern as well, and they eagerly transformed Lee's army into a great slave patrol that captured runaway slaves and returned them to their owners whenever possible."
Percentage of Households Owning Slaves
One of the signal accomplishments of Southern political leaders was their success in crafting a regionally distinct political ideology that drew the support of most white men. They did this by creating a language of rights and liberties that reconciled the sometimes conflicting demands of persona!, class, and party interests.''-Even as proslavery propagandists argued that only racial slavery could ceptualized and expressed tbeir motivations in a language of political rights without reference to slavery. Tbis ahility to frame issues in abstract rather than self-interested terms was one element that helped propagate and prolong tbe conflict. John Lightner, a young soldier stationed in Martinsburg, in the northwestern corner of Virginia in early 1861, claimed to understand the war's cause clearly. "This war is certainly a holy & just one, on our side; the other is none else than unconstitutional, brougbt on by wicked usurpation of power."" Like most Confederate men, Ligbtner did not need to detail the specific form of tbe "usurpation" perpetuated hy the North, so confident was be that his correspondent would understand hts meanmg.
Tbe particular patterns of enlistment in bigh slavebolding districts adds furtber evidence to support the contention tbat white men understood and appreciated the advantages they accrued from hving in a slave society. The relationship hetween enlistment and the percentage of the population that was enslaved bad the greatest explanatory power of any variable under scrutiny, indicating bow strong a stake nonslaveholders bad in slavery. Slaveholders worried, like Ruffin, about tbe loss of their productive capital. Nonslaveholders also worried about the economic ramifications of emancipation, in terms ofthe increased competition for jobs and in terms of tbe indirect decline in economic productivity that they anticipated with abolition. Tbe prospect of emancipation beld social concerns as well. Most Virginians of voting age could remember tbe 1831 uprising led by Nat Turner in Soutbampton County, where more than fifty wbites bad been killed; they bad lived through the John Brown raid of 1859. These episodes solidified the behef that black liberation would bring deatb and destruction to tbe white community. Even for those who did not accept these apocalyptic scenarios, emancipation portended a chaotic and terrifying new world. The multiple incentives for nonslaveholders to support slavery produced a harmony of white interests that resulted in very high support for the Confederacy in communities with the highest numbers of slaves; the majority of counties with more than 50 percent of their residents enslaved sent 75 percent or more of their eligible men to fight.
The sweep of enlistment across the state makes it hard to see wbo did not support tbe Confederacy. But by closely analyzing the edges of enlistment patterns, we can learn more about Confederate opposition witbin Virginia, Out of 148 Virginia counties in i860, eleven raised no companies for Confederate service. All of tbese counties lay in tbe extreme nortbwest, and nine bordered tbe Union. The two socioeconomic factors tbat these communities also had jn common were the absence of slavery and low wealtb-hoi dings. None of the eleven counties bad more than 5 percent slaveboiding households, and nine out of eleven had fewer than 2 percent slaveholding households. Further, although the white populations of tbese places reflected the variation of population rates in the state as a whole, they held less wealth on a per-family basis tban communities that enlisted more men, and they contained less wealtb tban average for the northwest region. Probably just as important as any of these demographic factors was the location of tbese counties along the edge of the Confederacy and their frequent occupation by Union troops.
While low rates of slave-and wealth-hoi ding and geographic proximity to the North seem to have deterred allegiance to the Confederacy, the same cannot be said for communities with low rates of slaveholding located in Virginia's interior. Six counties witb less than 5 percent slaveholding households sent 50 percent or more of their men to fight in Confederate armies. Unlike the counties that organized no companies, these low-slaveholding places had several other factors in common. Families living in Gilmer, Roane, and Braxton Counties, all located in the northwest, held much less wealth than their neighbors and had smaller white populations than was common in the area. The households in 44. The counties are identified with the lightest shading in figure i: Brooke, Clay, Doddridge, Hancock, Marshall, Mason, Morgan, Preston, Tucker, Tyler, and Welzel. Undoubtedly, many men Irom these counties served the Confederacy, but the fací that these places did not organize anycompaniesindicatesalackof popular support for the Confederate cause as well as a lack of institutional support ihat eliles in olher counties directed on behalf of the Confederacy. these counties owned farms with values almost 50 percent lower than the average for the northwest, These factors help explain the motives of the men who did enlist from these counties. Their support for the Confederacy represented dissatisfaction with the prevailing economic trends in their home region. The northwest had a weak commitment to slavery, and businessmen in the region were increasingly establisbing links with Northern markets. The people of Gilmer, Roane, and Braxton Counties do not seem to have benefited from that approach, and perhaps they saw a better economic future as members of an independent Southern Confederacy. Located in contested territory in the middle of northwest Virginia, the families in this region had more autonomy to decide their loyalty than those counties along the border with the Union or deeper in the interior ofthe Confederacy.
The three other counties with very low rates of slaveholding but high rates of enlistment were all located in southwest Virginia. Like their northern counterparts, families in Wise, Buchanan, and Wyoming Counties maintained smallerthan-average farms and held less wealth than others in their region. They too could have been fighting for the Confederacy in an attempt to preserve an economic future for themselves, albeit one based on slavery. Tbroughout the 1850s residents in this region deployed slave labor in a variety of agricultural and industrial settings to successfully expand the region's economy; thus they had every reason to continue pursuing what had already proven to be an effective economic strategy.''^ The people in the region advocated secession early in 1861, at least in part because of tbe threat to slavery posed by the Lincoln administration. In early Marcb tbe Abingdon Democrat ran an article entitled "A Prospective Stampede," in which the editors noted, "The Richmond Enquirer has private advices from different parts of the state, which inform it that a large number of the largest slaveholders in Virginia are already making preparations for an exodus." Tbe editors bemoaned tbe loss to the state of those good men because "they will carry away from us what is far more valuable to the state than property-thousands and tens of thousands of busy hands, which now constitute the productive labor of the state.""' The men from Wise, Buchanan and Wyoming Counties may have enlisted precisely because tbeir stake in slavery was so small; a new Confederacy that guaranteed the right to own slaves offered hope that they could expand their meager livelihoods in the coming years.
The pattern of enlistment across Virginia reveals the widespread mobilization of men accomplished by the Confederacy, which included non slaveholders, former Unionists, residents of wealthy and poor areas, and residents of both remote, mountainous communities and diverse urban ones. Aggregate analysis also allows us to identify with some precision those places that did not send men to fight for the Confederacy, Within Virginia, only those places that met a certain set of characteristics-few slaves, poor families, a history of opposition tosecession, and proximity to the North. Places that shared these traits were cut off from the economic success of Virginia in the 1840s and 1850s but not sufficiently engaged with the North to benefit from growth and development there. The Confederacy's firm commitment to an economy and society based on slavery presaged a continuation of these trends. As a restilt, the residents of these communities demonstrated a deep reluctance to invest themselves in the new Southern nation.
Similarly, no single issue or characteristic created steadfast Confederate loyalty. Those who supported the Confederacy did so by drawing on a wide variety of incentives. In 1861 the emotional inducements that men found in their families and communities, from love to honor to zeal to anxiety over proving one's manhood, tended to reinforce one another by encouraging secession and enlistment. Likewise, the intellectual justifications of a religious duty to preserve a biblically sanctioned social order and the politicaJ ideology of state rights initially blended with the material interests of most white Virginians. The security of slavery, the continuity of the robust and stable economic order Virginians had built in the 1850s, and the privilege of being white in the antebellum South aU depended on defending the society as it was in 1861. Families that held more interest in this society had stronger motivations to fight, a conclusion consistent with the finding that enlistment rates were highest among those parts of Virginia that held the most wealth and the most slaves. Virginians who made themselves into Confederates did so by drawing on love of their families, honor in their communities, and faith in their god, as weU as the material conditions of Southern life: the violence of slavery, the aggressive acquisitiveness of an emerging capitalist society, and the inequality of a society built on strict racial hierarchy.
The Old Dominion was not alone in this pattern. Although Virginia's antebellum experience differed from that of other Upper-or Deep-South states in many respects, soldiers from Georgia, Louisiana, or Tennessee would have come to the Confederacy with very simiiar beliefs and interests. The broad benefits from slavery and the synthesis of abstract ideological and material economic motivations encouraged a common Southern response. The challenge for the Confederacy as the war extended beyond 1861 was managing the tensions between the frequently contradictory elements of motivation in the context of a new nation.
The beliefs and events that motivated soldiers to enlist did not cause the war in any fundamental sense; historians are nearly unanimous in agreeing that slavery as a political and social issue drove the people of the two sections apart. Rather, the various sources of motivation upon which Southerners drew continued the conflict. Confederate Virginia successfiiUy mobilized nearly all of its white men of military age, a feat that reflects deep commitment to tbe war among tbe population as a whole. Blind optimism, overpowering confidence, and simple self-delusion played no small role in bolstering entbusiasm for the Confederate cause as the war dragged on, but beneatb tbese elements lay a considered and deeply felt dedication to preserving a world that had served most white people very well. If we can explain that commitment and its emotional, intellectual, and material origins, we will have come a long way toward understanding the meaning of tbe war for the participants and ourselves.
